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TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION
THOMAS A. THOMAS*
The law of trusts and succession in the State of Florida has gained
considerably in vitality during the period under consideration. The num-
ber of eases appearing before the Supreme Court was considerably greater
than during the previous similar period and the number of statutes enacted
by the Florida legislature greatly increased.
Of the several cases appearing before the Supreme Court some were
cases of first impression' while others, although calling for the application
of well settled principles of law, presented very interesting factual situations
which are worthy of note and treatment. The subject matter of the de-
cisions ranged from mental capacity to execute a will2 to the rule against
perpetuitiess and included will construction,4 the right to attorney's fees
for representing will contestants,5 disinheritance by wrongful conduct,6 the
right of a survivor to revoke a reciprocal will,7 devisees right to contest the
will,8 and constructive9 and resulting'0 trusts.
The statutes passed by the 1955 legislature constitute justification for
encouragement since the), represent a clear manifestation of the legislature's
intent to clarify and improve the law of trusts and succession by dispensing
with outdated and time consuming steps and procedures in the probate
process."
The necessary effect of some of these acts is to preserve the estate
from unnecessary expense without sacrificing safeguards insuring proper ad-
ministration.' 2 One statute3 derives particular significance from the fact
that it was apparently enacted for the purpose of codifying a recent Supreme
Court decision."4
Although the legislature has accomplished a great deal by way of
streamlining the law of trusts and succession, a great deal more remains to
"Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
1. In re Watkin's Estate, 75 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1954); In re Wilmott's Estate,
66 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1953); Doherty v. Traxler, 66 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1953).
2. Murrey v. Barnett Nat'l Bank, 74 So.2d 647 (Fla. 1954); Donnelly v. Mann,
68 So.2d 584 (Fla. 1953); In re Kiggen's Estate, 67 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1953).
3. Cartinhour v. Houser, 66 So.2d 686 (Fla. 1953).
4. Wright v. Sallet, 66 So.2d 237 (Fla. 1953).
5. In re Gleason's Estate, 74 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1954).
6. Doherty v. 'I'raxler, 66 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1953).
7. Simpson v. Ivey, 67 So.2d 687 (Fla. 1953).
8. Medary v. Dalman, 69 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1954).
9. Brown v. Skinner, 73 So.2d 221 (Fla. 1954); Omwake v, Omwake, 70 So.2d 565
(Fla. 1954).
10. Simpson v. Ioffman, 75 So.2d 703 (Fla. 1954); D'Uva v. D'Uva, 74 So.2d 889
(Fla. 1954).
11. FLA. STAT. § 734.22 (1955).
12. FLA. STAT. § 733.1, (1955); FLA. STAT. § 732.69 (1955).
13. FLA. STAT. § 731.03 (1955).
14. In re Watkin's Estate, 75 So 2d 194 (Via. 1954).
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be accomplished. Legislation which is discriminatory in nature and no
longer serves a useful purpose, remains in effect) 5  Legislative safeguards
which should be inposed rcmain lacking.'6
It is, therefore, one purpose of this article to reflect legislative short-
comings through an analysis of recent Supreme Court decisions and statutes.
DrCiSIONS
Unworthy Heirs. In the absence of statute, wrongful conduct by an heir
toward an intestate is insufficient to interfere with the heir's right to inherit
under the laws of descent and distribution. This result generally prevails
irrespective of the nature of the wrongful conduct; even though the con-
duct complained of is murder.2 7 This holding is justified upon the premise
that since the laws of descent and distribution prescribe a particular scheme
for the disposition of property of an intestate, a judicial alteration of that
scheme would constitute a performance of the legislative function. If
there are to be any exceptions to the scheme under the laws of descent and
distribution it is necessarily and peculiarly legislative in nature. In order
to preclude the obvious inequities in permittng an heir to profit from his
own wrongdoing, legislatures have enacted statutes which have been largely
motivated by public sentiment. In this respect, the Florida legislature has
limited its activity to a single statute"' which has the effect of denying a
person convicted of murder from inheriting from his murdered ancestor.
There is no statute in Florida affecting a spouse's right to inherit after
lie has been guilty of desertion and a bigamous marriage. In the light of
this profound lack of legislation, the Florida Supreme Court faced the prob-
lem squarely and for the first time in the case of Doherty v. Traxler.IU In
that case, the husband deserted his wife 24 hours after the marriage. He
was unheard of until after his wife's death, which was twenty years later,
when he appeared for the purpose of claiming her estate as her heir under
the laws of descent and distribution?0 It appeared that in his twenty-year
absence he entered into a bigamous marriage with a woman, with whom lie
was living at the time he attempted to claim his wife's estate. His claim
was contested by the brother of his wife who alleged that it would be
inequitable to permit the husband to inherit in the light of his desertion and
bigamy. In denying the husband the right to inherit, the Supreme Court
did so upon the ground that the husband, by virtue of his wrongful con-
duct, was estopped from claiming any interest in his wife's estate. It thus
appears that the scheme of distribution prescribed by law 2' was altered by
15. FiL. STAT. § 731.19 (1945).
16. E.g., a statute requiring a person having a claim against an estate to file both
the claim and notice of action in the County judge's Court.
17. ATKINsoN, WILLS, § 37 (2d ed. 1953).
18. FLA. STAT. § 731.31 (1945).
19. 66 So.2d 274 (FMa. 1953).
20. FiA. STAT. § 731.23 (1945).
21. ibid.
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the Suprcmc Court by virtue of the equities surrounding the circumstances.
Although the result arrivcd at by the court is most dcsirable when viewed
in the light of justice and equity, it is doubtful whether the Supreme Court
should undertake to make exceptions to the laws of descent and distribu-
tion; particularly since the legislature has undertaken to do so and has
limited its activity in that regard to a single exception, in the case of murder.
It is also doubtful whether a true estoppel existed as against the husband.
The Supreme Court upon other occasions has insisted upon the element
of reliance to detriment in order to create an estoppel,22 which element ap-
pears completely lacking in the instant case.
Will Construction. It is a cardinal rule of will construction that the
intent of the testator is to be given full force and effect whenever possible.
2
This rule is fortified by the equally well established principle that a will
is to be sustained whenever possible, since the law favors testacy over in-
testacy.24  Both of these principles found application in the factually
interesting case of Wright v. Sallet,25 wherein the Supreme Court had the
problem of determining the intent of the testator in devising three homes
described by street and number, and without delineation or other demarca-
tion. The homes were adjacent to one another and it was contended that
the devise was void for want of definiteness. In denouncing this conten-
tion the Supreme Court declared:
The law is well settled that lands may be devised by street and
number and such devises carry the real property, grounds and
other appurtenances on which the dwelling is located. 26
In effect, the Supreme Court reasoned that the three devisees named in the
will were tenants in common of an undivided one-third interest and would
hold the property in that capacity until a mutual division is made and per-
fected. It is submitted that this result is the only one possible when an
effort is made to give full force and effect to the testator's intent. Since
the testator devised the three homes by street and number and without
more specific description, it is quite evident that he intended the devisees to
share in the property equally and any other construction placd upon the
testamentary provision would obviously constitute violence to that intent.
Will Contestant's Right to Attorney's Fees. A personal representative,
either by initiating an action for the benefit of an estate or by defending an
action on behalf of the estate, is entitled to reimbursement for any and all
expenses necessarily incurred.27 However, the right of a person, other than
the personal representative, contesting the validity of a subsequent will, to
22. Price Mercantile Co. v. Cay, 44 So.2d 87 (Fla. 1950).
23. In re Barrett's Estate. 159 Fla. 901, 33 So.2d 159 (1948); Ilusson v. Bensel,
124 Fla. 304, 168 So. 395 (1936); Roberts v. Mosely, 100 Fla. 267, 129 So. 835 (1930).
24. In re Smith, 49 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1950).
23. 66 So.2d 237 (Fla. 1953).
26. Id. at 238.
27. FI..t. SrAr. § 734.01(2) (1951).
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an allowance from the estate of attorney's fees is subject to conflicting
views. According to some states the right of a will contestant to an allow-
ance of fees depends upon probable justification for initiating the contest.2"S
However, according to what appears to bc the prevailing view, the right
to attorney's fees in such instances depends upon the successful conclusion
of the contest.20
In the case of Wilmott's Estate0 which was a case of first impression
in the State of Florida, the Supreme Court subscribed to the latter position
upon the theory that the prevention of distribution under an invalid will
necessarily has the effect of benefiting the estate, although nothing has been
added to the value of the corpus of the estate. Consequently, although the
distribution of the estate under the laws of descent and distribution is
essentially the same as it would have been had it been disposed of according
to the invalid will, attorney's fee would be awarded to the contestant for
successfully setting the will aside. Success in setting the will aside is an
essential ingredient before attorney's fees will be awarded since the Supreme
Court has held that heirs who unsuccessfully attempted to destroy a trust
created under their ancestor's valid will are not entitled to attorney's fees.3 '
Further, an unsuccessful attempt to revoke' the probate of a will is not
justification for the award of attorney's fees. 32
Rule Against Perpetuities. At the common law, the period of the rule
against perpetuities consisted of a life or lives in being plus 21 years there-
after, plus the period of gestation. 33  This common law period has been
accepted by Florida and remains in full force and effect.34  When applied
to a particular situation, it requires that the title to property must be
vested, if at all, within a designated life or lives in being plus 21 years
thereafter. In determining whether the rule has been violated the courts
are assisted by the principles that the law favors the early vesting of
estates; and that if a will is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of
which would turn it into an illegal perpetuity, and the other would make
it valid and operative, the latter would be adopted upon the presumption
that the testator intended to execute a valid and binding willY: Thus,
where the testatrix provided that it was her intention that all of her
property be kept intact for a period of not less than ten years, or longer
in the discretion of the executor or trustee, and that at the end of ten
years the executor or trustee could, if lie desired, make distribution to
named beneficiaries, the rule against perpetuities is not violated.30  The
28. Conner v. Brown, 39 Del. 529, 3 A.2d 64 (1938).
29. In re Merica's Estate, 99 Neb. 229, 155 N.\V. 887 (191i5).
30. 66 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1953).
31. Lewis v. Gaillard, 70 Fla. 172, 69 Sa. 797 (1915).
32, Smith v. Callison, 152 Fla. 516, 12 So.2d 381 (1943).
33. Story v. First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 115 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934).
34. ibid.
35. Cartinhour v. Houser, 66 So.2d 686 (Fla. 1953).
36. Ibid.
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rationale c(iplovcd by the court in sustaining the provisiou was to the
effect that the testatrix had intended that the property was to vest in the
named beneficiaries immediately upon her death and only the possession
of the property was to be withheld for the minimum period of ten years.
When the decision is considered in the light of the construction used by
the court, it is, of course, correct since it is well established that the rule
against perpetuities applies to remoteness of vesting and has no application
where mere possession of the property is postponed.
Stock Dividend. In the case of In re Vail's Estate, the Florida Supreme
Court was for the first time confronted with the problem of who was en-
titled to a stock dividend declared subsequent to the execution of the will,
but prior to the testator's death. The specific legatee contended that a
stock dividend constituted a mcre change in form and not in substance,
consequently the additional shares so acquired should pass under the specific
bequest. The residuary legatee contended that there was no substantial
difference between a cash and stock dividend and since a cash dividend
would inure to the benefit of the residuary legatee, 39 so should the stock
dividend. After an exhaustive examination of the authorities, the Florida
Supreme Court held that there was a marked distinction between a cash
and stock dividend in that a cash dividend carries with it absolute and un-
bridled dominion and control over the subject matter, whereas a stock
dividend represented a limited, circumscribed dominion and control of
the assets of the declaring corporation. In this respect the Florida Supreme
Court subscribed to the minority view.
Apparently, in subscribing to this view the court failed to fully under-
stand two elements. First, when a stock dividend is declared it simply
amounts to a transfer by the corporation to its capital account either surplus
or accumulated funds which would otherwise be paid in cash to the stock-
holders) 0 Second, when a stockholder obtains a stock dividend it repre-
sents an interest over and above his original stockholding and could very
easily be liquidated and converted into cash. It thus appears that the dis-
tinction made by many courts between a stock and cash dividend amounts
to a distinction of form rather than substance.
The Right of a Survivor to Revoke a Reciprocal Will. The right of a
survivor to mutual wills to revoke is, of course, dependent upon the oxistence
of a contract between the parties. While it can be reasonably implied that
the parties to a mutual will have agreed to execute a will it does not neces-
sarily follow that an agreement not to revoke has been entered into either
expressly or by implication. In this respect, there is no separate law of
contracts in wills; however the existence of an agreement not to revoke
37. 66 So.2d 686, 688-689 (Fla. 1953).
38. 67 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1953).
39. Id. at 668.
40. Sherman v. Riley, 43 R.I. 202, 110 At]. 629 (1920).
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must necessarily bc established as in the case of the other contracts. Consc-
quently, those who allege the existence of an agreement not to revoke have
the burden of proving the cxistence of the contract by a preponderance of
the evidence.4"
The fact that an agreement not to revoke has been entered into between
parties to a mutual will does not suggest that the will of the survivor executed
in violation of the agreement cannot be admitted into probate. To deny
probate would necessarily confer upon the County Judge's Court the obliga-
tion of determining issues such as the existence of the contract, the validity
of the agreement and its specific performance, which would clearly be beyond
his jurisdiction. Therefore, when a survivor to mutual wills violates an
agreement not to revoke it appears that the only remedy available should
be in the form of a constructive trust in chancery.
Mental Capacity. The Florida Statutes require that a person, in order
to be competent to execute a will, must be of "sound mind."42  This re-
quirement is not necessarily violated through old age or mental weakness.43
Nor does the fact that the testator was habitually intoxicated 4' or used
narcotics4" affect his testamentary capacity. So long as the testator has
a recognition of the nature of the disposition he is making, the extent of
his property and the natural objects of his bounty,46 the requirement of
"sound mind" is deemed satisfied. Mental capacity to execute a will is,
of course, determined as of the time the will is executed.47 Thus, although
a testator is insane at the time of his death, his will is valid if executed
during a lucid interval.48 The question of "mental capacity" is one of fact
and upon appeal it is the duty of the court to give effect to findings made
by the trier of fact if supported by substantial competent evidence.' 9
Enforceability of Contracts to Devise. Contracts to devise property
are generally held to be valid and enforceable so long as they are founded
upon good and adequate consideration. In that regard, it is agreed that a
mere promise to leave one's property to a certain person, unsupported by
any consideration, is unenforceable.50 However, an agreement to furnish
service, care or support to the promissor is adequate to render the agreement
enforceable.5 ' Even an agreement to live with the promissor is generally
41. Simpson v. Ivey, 67 So.2d 687 (Fla. 1953).
42. FLA. STAT. § 731.04 (1945).
43. Murrey v. Barnett Nat'l Bank, 74 So.2d 647, 649 (Fla. 1954):
. ..even a lunatic may make a will or a sale of property in a lucid
interval. Feebleness of body or mental weakness does not tend to create
the presumption of incompetence nor authorize a court of equity to set
aside a [trust] deed.
44. Fernstrom v. Taylor, 107 Fla. 490, 145 So. 208 (1933).
45. Ibid.
46. Neal v. Harrington, 159 Fla. 381, 31 So.2d 391 (1946).
47. Miller v. Flowers, 158 Fla. 51, 27 So.2d 667 (1946).
48. In re Carnegie's Estate, 153 Fla. 7, 13 So.2d 299 (1943).
49. See note 43 suibra.
50. ATKINSON ON WILLS, p. 212, § 48 (2d ed. 1953).
51. Ibid.
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held to be sufficiently dcscriptive of the services to be rendered as to be
worthy of specific pcrformancc.- Florida subscribes to the prevailing view
as evidenced by the case of Donnelly v. Mann.A In that case the mother
agreed to devise and bequeath her estate to her daughter upon the daugh-
ter's promise to care for the mother the balance of her lifetime. After the
daughter had entered upon performance under the contract, the mother
attempted to have the agreement rescinded upon the ground that the
daughter had mistreated her and had exercised undue influence in securing
the agreement. The court was satisfied that the evidence showed a com-
plete lack of undue influence in the execution of the agreement and ac-
cordingly granted specific performance.
Resulting Trusts. A resulting trust is created by a court of equity
based upon the implied intention of the parties. The circumstances giving
rise to its creation are first, where an attempt to create an express trust
fails; second, where an express trust already in existence terminates accord-
ing to its own terms and no provision is made for disposition of the re-
mainder; and third, where one person pays the consideration for property
and has title taken in the name of another. In the latter case, where the
relationship of the parties is that of strangers, a presumption favoring a
resulting trust is created in favor of the person paying the consideration
for the property, title to which is taken in the name of the other. However,
where the relationship is that of husband and wife and the husband pays
the consideration for the property and has title taken in the name of his
wife a resulting trust is more difficult to establish by virtue of the presump-
tion of gift. This presumption is rebuttable, however, the facts must be
definite and unequivocal in order to constitute a successful rebuttal.54
Constructive Trusts. A constructive trust is created by a court of equity
for the purpose of preventing fraud or unjust enrichment. It is not de-
pendent for its creation upon the intent of the parties since it is a remedial
device designed to prevent a person from profiting from his own wrong-
doing.55  A very interesting factual situation involving the use of a con-
structive trust was presented in Omwake v. Omwake." In this case the
husband purchased property under a contract for deed in his own name,
however, subsequently he assigned the contract to his wife. Thereafter, his
wife delivered the assignment to a real estate broker with instructions to sell
the property. The husband obtained the assignment from the real state
broker without the knowledge of his wife and made marks upon the assign-
ment indicating it was voided. Upon discovery of the fact the wife was
assured by her husband that his purpose was not to divest her of any in-
terest in the property and in order to show his sincerity he executed a deed
52. Ibid.
53. 68 So.2d 584 (Fla. 1953).
54. Medary v, Dalnan, 69 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1954).
5r. ATKINSON ON WI.Ls, p. 270, § 57 (2d ed. 1953).
56 70 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1954).
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in blank in her favor. A prospective purchaser of the propcrty rcfuscd to
accept the deed signed in blank and thereafter the wife had another deed
executed by a person whom she represented to be her husband; however,
the person was not so identified by the attorney for the purchaser. The
husband purchased the property from the original vendors in his own name;
however, the wife conveyed the same property by deed to others. In hold-
ing that the husband was constructive trustee of the property for the benefit
of his wife the court apparently did so upon the basis that the husband
knew of the facts and circumstances regarding the wife's transaction and
instead of repudiating it, he, in effect, ratified it. In order to transfer
the property from the wife to her grantees the court reasoned that the wife
was estopped from claiming any interest adverse to that of her grantees,
notwithstanding the existence of the statute requiring a husband to join in
a conveyance by his wife of her separate property.57 It appears that al-
though the court arrived at an equitable result, it did so only by contraven-
ing the legislative intent which required joinder of the husband in a con-
veyance of property by the wife."
Election. Generally, a person who receives a benefit under a will must
elect to accept the provision made in his favor or to assert his independent,
paramount title to property which is rightfully his, although, devised by
the testator to another.50  This necessity for election is based upon the
doctrine of estoppel which precludes a person from asserting inconsistent
positions, i.e. the will is valid in one respect and invalid in another. To
this principle, requiring an election, there are exceptions, one of which
found application in the case of Medary v. Dalman.60 In that case the hus-
band alleged that he had paid the entire consideration for property, title to
which he had taken in the name of his wife as a convenience only. His
wife died, devising a one-fourth interest in the property to her husband
who sought to have a resulting trust declared in his favor for the entire
fee. In holding that the husband was not obliged to renounce his one-
fourth interest under the will in order to assert his right to the entire
premises the Florida Supreme Court declared:
This is a case where "the donee would not receive under the will
a benefit to which he would not be entitled except for the will" in
which event no election is required. 6'
Of course, if the husband was devised property belonging to the testatrix,
he would then be obligated to elect between the provision in his favor
57. FLA. STAT. § 708.04 (1927):
The husband and wife shall join in all sales, transfers and conveyances
of the property of the wife, other than personal property and choses in
action.
58. Ibid.
59. 57 AM. JuR., Wills § 1556; ATKINSON ON WVILLS, p. 768, § 138 (2d ed. 1953).
60, 69 So.2d 888 (F1a, 1954).
61. Id. at 890.
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and his independent claim to property belonging to him although devised
by the testatrix to another02
Incorporation by Reference. It is generally recognized that an outside
instrument is capable of being made a part of a last will and testament
although not executed in conformity to the statute of wills by virtue of
the doctrine of incorporation by reference which has been adopted by a
number of states. However, before the doctrine can be applied the instru-
inent sought to be incorporated must be in existence at the time of the
will's execution, it must be referred to with sufficient certainty for proper
identification, and reference to it must indicate that the instrument is al-
ready in existence. Thus, it has been held that where the instrument
sought to be incorporated by reference is not in existence at the time of the
will's execution it cannot be regarded as a part of the will." : This holding
is deemed necessary in order to prevent the perpetration of fraud. Since
the doctrine of incorporation by reference is, in effect, an exception to the
statute of wills, care must be exercised in its application in order to preserve
the purpose and intent of the statute of wills.
Compensation of Trustees. At the common law a trustee was not
entitled to compensation since his office was regarded as honorary in charac-
ter and it was a privilege to be selected for the performance of the duties.
However, today it is generally conceded that a trustee is entitled to com-
pensation which is conferred either by statute or judicial decision. Where
there is no statute expressly defining the amount of the trustee's compensa-
tion, it is generally agreed that lie is entitled to reasonable compensation
as determined in the light of all surrounding circumstances. The factors
employed in determining what is reasonable by way of trustee's compen-
sation are:
1. The extent of the trust corpus;
2. The nature of the trust property;
3. The nature of the trustee's activities;
4. The benefits inuring to the trust as a result of the trustee's
services;
5. The rendition of services by the trustee which are of benefit
to the trust and are not regarded as normal functions of the trustee.
Thus, in the case of Osius v. Miami Beach First National Bank,64 it
was held that where a trustee performed no services with the exception of
distributing the trust corpus and where the trust corpus consisted of
$250,000 in value, a fee of $12,500 was excessive. However, where the
trustee performed extraordinary service thereby benefiting the estate in
litigation involving the estate, additional compensation was warranted. 5
62. 57 Am. JUR., Wills § 1557.
63. In re Gregory's Estate, 70 So.2d 903 (Fla. 1954).
64. 74 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1954).
65. Id. at 780.
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Interpretation of Attestation. The necessity for witnesses to a will
to subscribe their names to the instrument was presented for the first time
in Florida in the case of In re Watkin's Estate.0 In this case, the testator
requested two persons to bear witness to his signature which he was
about to affix to his last will and testament and further requested them
to subscribe their signatures to the instrument. After the testator had
affixed his signature one of the witnesses signed his name, however, the
other refused to do so. The will was offered for probate and denied by
the county judge upon the ground that it was not properly executed as
required by the statute of wills. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's holding upon the ground that the term "attesting witnesses" was
used by the legislature in the broader sense, rather than in the narrow
and restricted sense. In arriving at this conclusion the Supreme Court
emphasized the statutory provision which requires that all devises and
bequests to "subscribing witnesses" are void unless there are two other
disinterested witnesses to the will.67  Such a strict interpretation derives
considerable justification from the fact that its effect is to prevent the
perpretration of frauds. However, where the evidence conclusively estab-
lishes that no fraud was committed and since the language of the statute68
imposing requirements for the execution of wills does not make mention
of "subscribing," the holding appears to be unjustified. Apparently, the
legislature recognized the problem to be legislative in nature since it
enacted a statute"" defining attestation as including subscription.
Legislation. The law of succession and trusts received adequate rcpre-
senation during the 1955 legislative session. Although some statutes
enacted were of minor importancc70 the majority of them were designed
to effectuate proper administration of estates and a savings to estates by
dispensing with the necessity of certain steps without sacrifice of safeguards.
In order to prevent intcrmeddling in the estate of a domiciliary
decedent, the Florida Legislature provided, in effect, that no title to
personal property shall pass until administered and distributed by the
domiciliary personal representative. 7' While this provision imposes a very
great burden upon non-resident bona fide purchasers for value, without
notice, of the personal property of a dccedent, it derives justification by
preventing dissipation of the estate of a decedent without authorization.
66. 75 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1954).
67. FLA. STAT. § 731.07(5) (1951).
68. FLA. STAT. § 731.07 (1945).
69. FLA. STAT. § 731.03 (1955).
70. Laws of F/a., c. 29948 1955)(exempts profit-sharing trusts for the benefit
of employees from the rule against perpetuities); Laws of Fla., c. 29876 (1955) (authorizes
a trustee of an express trust to keep insurance in full force and effect for the proper
protection of property); Laws of Fla., c. 29861 (1955)(proceeds of a life insurance
policy to be paid to the personal representative of a decedent's estate when the insurance
is payable either to the insured or to the estate of the insured, his executors, administrators
or assigns, or in the event the insured should die intestate).
71. Ft-,, STAT. § 732.26(1) (1955).
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In an effort to further safeguard decedent estates the legislature imposed
the obligation upon personal representatives to take possession of the real
and personal property situated within Florida of persons dying while
domiciled in a sister state or foreign country. 2 In the light of these two
statutory provisions it is evident that the legislature has made every
effort to preserve the estate of decedents, whether domiciled in the State
of Florida or non-residents leaving property situated within the State of
Florida.
To properly determine whether a personal representative is performing
his statutory duties a requirement was imposed obligating the personal
representative to file an inventory reflecting the real and personal property
of the decedent without regard to situs.7 3  Although several grounds
existed for the removal of a personal representative, an additional ground
was added by the 1955 legislature whereby a personal representative is
subject to removal because of conflicting or adverse interest which he may
hold against the estate. 74  However, in determining adversity as grounds
for removal an exception is made in the case of a widow with the right
of election to take dower or the right to claim a family allowance or
exemption.
In an effort to preserve an estate from unnecessary expense and delay,
the legislature provided for the waiver of the final accounting by the
personal representative when all heirs and beneficiaries manifest their
consent in writing.15  In order to prevent possible injustices, the waiver
does not operate automatically but remains subject to consent by the
court. An additional statute was enacted which confers upon the County
Judge the right to allot and set off dower, thereby dispensing with the
necessity of appointing three commissioners in instances where the inter-
ested parties agreed to the allotment or where the assets are of such a
nature as to permit allotment of dower definitively and without doubt.76
72. I'LA. SrA-r. § 733.01(1) (1955).
73. FLA. SrAT. § 733.03 (1955).
74. FLA. STAT. § 734.11 (1955).
75. FLA. STAT. § 734.22 (1955).
76. FL.A STAT. § 733.13 1955).
